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On The Smiths’s song “Meat is Murder” (1985), Morrissey indignantly sings 
 
And the flesh you so fancifully fry  
Is not succulent, tasty or kind 
It’s death for no reason  
And death for no reason is murder 
 
and 
 
Kitchen aromas aren’t very homely  
It’s not comforting, cheery, or kind  
It’s sizzling blood and the unholy stench  
Of murder 
 
It is obvious that Morrissey is making a statement about the moral status of meat: as 
the song’s title says, it is murder. Even though it is less obvious, Morrissey also seems 
to be making a statement about the aesthetic status of meat: it is not succulent, tasty, 
homely, or comforting.1 Plausibly, by making these two statements together, 
Morrissey is thereby making a third, philosophically provocative statement about the 
interaction between moral and aesthetic values of food: the moral defect of meat 
makes for an aesthetic defect. 
In recent times, the humor-oriented and hipster-approved T-shirt company 
Threadless has responded to Morrissey. One of their most popular shirts is emblazed 
with the slogan: 
 
 Meat is murder. Tasty, tasty murder. 
 
Threadless thus agrees with Morrissey on the moral status of meat: it is murder. 
However, even while acknowledging the moral status of meat, Threadless disagrees 
with Morrissey on the aesthetic status of meat: it is, in fact, tasty. Plausibly, by 
making these two statements together, Threadless is also thereby making a third, 
philosophically provocative statement about the interaction between moral and 
aesthetic values of food: the moral defect of meat is aesthetically irrelevant. 
                                                
* For their helpful feedback, we thank Anne Barnhill, Mark Budolfson, Tyler Doggett, Andy Egan, Simon Fokt, 
Eileen John, Hanna Kim, Alex Plakias, and members of Hans Maes’s graduate seminar on the art and aesthetics of 
food and drink. 
1 Some readers might resist the thought that succulence and tastiness are aesthetic attributes. See section 3 for 
discussions of different senses of aesthetic value that might be relevant to this debate. 
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Our chapter is more or less about this exchange between Morrissey and 
Threadless. We will explore the interaction between moral and aesthetic values of 
food, in part by connecting it to existing discussions of the interaction between 
moral and aesthetic values of art (§1). Along the way, we will consider the artistic 
status of food (§2), the aesthetic value of food (§3), and the role of expertise in 
uncovering aesthetic value (§4). Ultimately we will argue that the interaction 
between moral and aesthetic values of food is more complicated than the 
disagreement between Morrissey and Threadless suggests. Indeed, we will suggest a 
position concerning this interaction that differs from Morrisey’s and Threadless’s 
(§5). We will conclude by drawing out broader implications of this position for 
discussions on the ethics of food and discussions on the interaction between the 
moral and aesthetic values of art (§6). 
 
1. Interaction Between Morality and Aesthetics of Art 
 
Philosophical discussions on the interaction between morality and aesthetics have 
been primarily focused on art. Specifically, philosophers have been centrally 
concerned with the morality-to-aesthetics connection in the ethical criticism of art 
debate.2 We can give one taxonomy of this debate centered on this question: what is 
the connection between the moral value and the aesthetic value of an artwork?3 
Art autonomists say that an artwork’s moral value is unconnected to its 
aesthetic value.4 That is, both moral defects and moral virtues are aesthetically 
irrelevant. Although one can certainly criticize an artwork on moral grounds, such 
moral criticism is never relevant to aesthetic criticism of the artwork. 
Art moralists say an artwork’s moral value is directly connected to its 
aesthetic value.5 On a stronger formulation, exemplified by Berys Gaut’s ethicism, a 
work’s manifesting a morally defective attitude always makes for an aesthetic defect 
and, correspondingly, manifesting a moral virtuous attitude always makes for an 
aesthetic virtue. On a weaker formulation, arguably exemplified by Noël Carroll’s 
moderate moralism, some moral defects make for aesthetic defects and some moral 
virtues make for aesthetic virtues, even if there are also moral defects and moral 
virtues that are aesthetically neutral. 
All variants of art moralism endorse the valence constraint (Harold 2008): 
the claim that a feature’s effect on the work’s moral value must have the same 
                                                
2 Harold (2006) and Stecker (2005) are exceptions that discuss the aesthetics-to-morality connection. 
3 As Harold (2008: 45-46) says, “The literature on this subject is now rich with variants of moralism and autonomism, 
making it difficult to give a general characterization of either view that all of those associated with that view would 
accept.” As such, with the following taxonomy, we only aim to provide one reasonable way to bring out different 
views’ central tenets and draw out their respective differences. See Eaton (2016), Giovanelli (2007), McGregor (2014), 
and Stecker (2005) for alternative taxonomies of the ethical criticism of art debate. 
4 Defenders of art autonomism include Anderson & Dean (1998), Cooke (2014), Harold (2011), Lamarque & Olsen 
(1994), and Posner (1997; 1998). In our experience, art autonomism is also a common default view amongst people 
who are not professional philosophers. 
5 In our experience, art moralism is the dominant view amongst philosophers of art. Defenders of art moralism 
include Booth (1998), Carroll (1996; 1998), Clifton (2013), Eaton (2001), Gaut (1998), Gilmore (2011), Hanson 
(1998), Harold (2008), Kieran (2001), Mullin (2004), Nussbaum (1998), and Stecker (2008). Hume (1757) is 
sometimes cited as a historical predecessor of contemporary art moralism, but this interpretation of Hume is highly 
contested (cf. Mason 2001 and Dadlez & Bicknell 2013). 
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valence as its effect on the work’s aesthetic value, regardless of the magnitude of the 
effect. The valence constraint accommodates both ethicism and moderate moralism; 
moderate moralists simply include some effects with zero magnitude. Given their 
adherence to the valence constraint, all art moralists say that a moral defect can 
never make for an aesthetic virtue and a moral virtue can never make for an aesthetic 
defect. 
Art immoralists say artworks exhibit different connections between moral 
value and aesthetic value.6 Specifically, they deny the valence constraint; they say that 
sometimes an artwork’s moral value is inversely connected to its aesthetic value. 
However, despite their misleading name, they do not say that an artwork’s moral 
value is always inversely connected to its aesthetic value; sometimes an artwork’s 
moral value is directly connected to its aesthetic value, and other times an artwork’s 
moral value is unconnected to its aesthetic value. (Indeed, sometimes this position is 
called “contextualism” instead to avoid false implications.) When art immoralists 
reject the valence constraint, they focus specifically on cases in which the connection 
between an artwork’s moral defect and its aesthetic virtue is no accident. However, 
different art immoralists spell out this non-accidental connection in different ways. 
Indeed, within the ethical criticism of art debate, one can find various 
characterizations of the relevant connection between moral and aesthetic value.7 
Some theorists suggest that the relevant connection is “internal” or conceptual. For 
example, Matthew Kieran (2006: 130-131) frames the debate in terms of whether 
there are internal relations between the moral and the aesthetic or, instead, they are 
conceptually distinct. Some theorists suggest that the relevant connection is quasi-
causal or explanatory. For example, A.W. Eaton (2012: 283) argues for the claim that 
“an immoral feature of an artwork can make a significant positive aesthetic 
contribution precisely in virtue of its immorality.” Some theorists suggest that the 
relevant connection is counterfactual dependence. For example, Daniel Jacobson 
(2005: 342) argues for the claim that “the very features of an artwork that render it 
morally dubious can contribute essentially to its aesthetic value”. That is, if one took 
away the moral defect by taking away the underlying features, then one would also 
thereby take away the aesthetic virtue that involve the same underlying features. 
Obviously, the taxonomy given above is complicated by these different 
characterizations of the relevant connection between moral and aesthetic value. 
Given these different characterizations, it would be unsurprising to find in this 
literature, say, a self-professed variant of art moralism that turns out to be 
compatible with a self-professed variant of art immoralism.8 So, to be clear, our 
                                                
6 Defenders of art immoralism—though sometimes under other names, such as “art contextualism”—include Eaton 
(2012), John (2005), Jacobson (1997; 2005), and Kieran (2003, 2006). Even though Jacobson, in his pioneering “In 
Praise of Immoral Art” (1997), identifies immoralism with anti-theory, this conception is not widely shared by 
others. Stecker (2008) argues that anti-theorists need not (and should not) be immoralists, and the other immoralists 
named above tend to not position themselves as anti-theorists. 
7 In fact, the relevant connection between moral and aesthetic value is sometimes unspecified or underspecified. See 
McGregor (2014) for related complaints about the vague terminology in this debate. Although McGregor’s 
complaints primarily concern the vagueness of “moral defect” and “aesthetic defect”, such vagueness has the 
downstream effect of making the relevant connection between moral defect and aesthetic defect unclear as well. 
8 For one example, John (2005) is classified as an immoralist on our taxonomy even though she calls her view 
“opportunistic moralism” because she allows that, even though it is not standard, a moral defect can make for an 
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philosophical interests do not lie with whether some particular position is best 
labeled as ‘autonomism’, ‘moralism’, or ‘immoralism’. Instead, our philosophical 
interests lie with the substantive questions about the connection—or, more likely, 
connections—between moral and aesthetic value. Thinking about the central tenets 
associated with these labels and potential points of disagreement is simply a 
convenient way to gesture toward the substantive questions. 
It should also be emphasized that this debate is concerned with pro tanto, 
rather than all-things-considered, connection between moral and aesthetic value. For 
example, in describing his view, Gaut explicitly states that “the ethicist principle is a 
pro tanto one: it holds that a work is aesthetically meritorious (or defective) insofar 
as it manifests ethically admirable (or reprehensible) attitudes” (1998: 182). Hence, 
even according to the ethicist, there can be an artwork that contains a moral defect 
that is still all-things-considered aesthetically meritorious. 
The debate between art autonomists, art moralists, and art immoralists have 
centered on works that are traditionally considered to be art, such as novels and 
films. As such, before we can consider applying or extending this debate to food, we 
will have to start by saying more about the artistic status of food and the aesthetic 
value of food. 
 
2. The Artistic Status of Food 
 
Is food art?9 There is no univocal answer to this question because food and art are 
both highly heterogeneous categories. In this section, we consider three ways of 
answering this question and their relevance, if any, for applying or extending the 
ethical criticism of art debate to food. 
 
2.1. Food-Based Art 
 
One way we can answer the question “is food art?” is to consider works that are 
recognizably art and centrally involve food. 
To start, consider artworks that use materials that would normally be 
recognized as food. Kara Walker’s A Subtlety, or the Marvelous Sugar Baby, an 
Homage to the unpaid and overworked Artisans who have refined our Sweet tastes 
from the cane fields to the Kitchens of the New World on the Occasion of the 
demolition of the Domino Sugar Refining Plant (2014) involves a massive sculpture 
made of sugar. Daniel Spoerri makes tableaux pièges (or “snare-pictures”) that 
                                                                                                                         
aesthetic merit. For another example, Jacobson (2005) maintains that the slogan of Carroll’s moderate moralism 
(1996; 1998) is compatible with Jacobson’s variant of immoralism. And, indeed, Carroll (2000, 2013) officially 
maintains that moderate moralism is logically compatible with immoralism. However, Jacobson also argues that, 
when one looks beyond the simplistic slogan, other aspects of Carroll’s theory in fact commits him to a minimally 
moralist position that is incompatible with immoralism. And Eaton (2013) echoes Jacobson’s observation of the 
disconnect between the official statement of moderate moralism and other claims that Carroll makes about the 
connection between moral and aesthetic values of artworks. 
9 Meskin (2013) gives an accessible overview of the contemporary responses to this question. In addition to 
contemporary responses that this section highlights, earlier responses to this question can be found in Harris (1979), 
Quinet (1981), and Winterbourne (1981). 
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involve affixing various items, often the leftovers of meals, to various surfaces. 
Viviane Le Courtois’s 2012 exhibition at the Boulder Museum of Contemporary Art, 
Edible?, contained melted candy sculptures, video installations of eating and food 
preparation, and an interactive installation involving an indoor garden and the 
chance to make tea from herbs grown there.  
One might worry that a number of the previous examples are not really cases 
of food-based art; after all, they are not designed to be experienced through eating. 
That is, they do not function as food even if—in the case of the works by Spoerri and 
Le Courtois—they were made with materials that were food at one time. It is 
instructive here to consider Marcel Duchamp’s readymades. His In Advance of a 
Broken Arm (1915) involved the selection and display of an ordinary snow shovel, 
but although there is a sense in which this shows that a snow shovel can be a work of 
art, it does not show that something can function as both a snow shovel and a work 
of art at the same time. (Similarly, the possibility of a collage made of cuttings from 
pornographic magazines does not establish that something can function as both art 
and pornography.10) So although the fact that these items were made with food is 
relevant to their appreciation, they do not seem like the most interesting cases of 
food-based art.  
True food-based art would thus have to centrally involve food functioning as 
food. Such works exist. For example, Hermann Nitsch’s Das Orgien Mysterien 
Theater (1957) is performed on some occasions with the experience of eating food 
being a component. Rupe (1999) describes one such performance as follows: 
 
… an invading tank (yes, an actual war-sized tank) trampled onto the castle grounds 
to be doused with both animal blood and roses. The deaths of the three bulls during 
the play were offered as life for the participants. There was no hiding the fact that 
the meat came from the death of an animal: This is not a hamburger, this is a dead 
bull, and you’re eating it. 
 
For a less disturbing example, Rirkrit Tiravanija’s Untitled (Free) (1992) involves 
converting the gallery into a kitchen space where the artist served Thai curry and rice 
to the audience. Despite their notable differences, both artworks centrally involve 
food that functions as food, and therefore count as true food-based art. 
The ethical criticism of art debate applies straightforwardly to food-based art. 
For example, with Nitsch’s Das Orgien Mysterien Theater, an autonomist would say 
that the moral defect involved in the live animal slaughtering—assuming there is 
such a defect—does not make for an aesthetic defect but a moralist would say that it 
does. An immoralist might even say that it makes for an aesthetic virtue—without it, 
the work would be far less transgressive and thus aesthetically interesting, at least on 
its initial performance.  
So, there are artworks that centrally involve food that is experienced as such, 
and the ethical criticism of art debate is directly relevant to these artworks. Yet, these 
cases seem to not be fully relevant to discussing morality and aesthetics of food 
                                                
10 See the essays collected in Maes and Levinson (2012) for discussions about the relationship between art and 
pornography, especially whether the two are mutually exclusive categories. 
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because they seem quite distant from what we typically think of when we think of 
food. Let us consider two other ways of answering the question “is food art?” to see if 
even more relevant cases can be found. 
 
2.2. Artified Food 
 
Another way we can answer the question “is food art?” is to consider food that are 
“artified”—the kind of high-brow food that might be recognized as art. Arguably the 
best contemporary examples are from the so-called molecular gastronomy 
movement, such as the dishes and meals that were once found at Ferran Adrià’s El 
Bulli. For example, El Bulli’s reverse spherical olive (2005) is an elaborate 
reconstruction of olive oil and olive juice in the shape of an olive, using a technique 
that is new to gastronomy. This kind of food might to be thought to be a hybrid art 
form that combines haute cuisine, sculpture, various technologies, and performance 
art or theatre.  
If this kind of food is art, then the ethical criticism of art debate is also 
directly relevant, in just the same way that this debate is relevant for Nitsch’s Das 
Orgien Mysterien Theater. However, while these cases are more recognizable as food 
than food-based artworks, they still seem fairly distant from our ordinary culinary 
experiences. A robust understanding of the interaction between the morality and 
aesthetics of food requires a consideration of what we will call “food of everyday life”. 
  
2.3. The Food of Everyday Life 
 
The food of everyday life is the food we consume on a day-to-day basis, such as pizza, 
ramen, tacos, and spinach salads. Many will intuitively deny that all food of everyday 
life count as art. Microwaveable French fries, sausage rolls, and tofu hot dogs do not 
seem to be art. However, that leaves open the possibility that some of the food of 
everyday life counts as art, even if much of it does not—in the same way that some 
films are plausibly art even if others are not. 
Whether some food of everyday life can count as art is a question that has 
been taken up by a number of contemporary philosophers. Many of them allow that 
such food can count as art but that it does not rise to the level of the “major” or “fine” 
arts. So, for example, Elizabeth Telfer argues that food can count as art in its own 
right and that cookery is an art form since some dishes are “intended or used wholly 
or largely for aesthetic consideration” (Telfer 1996: 46). But Telfer characterizes food 
as both “simple” and “minor”—simple because taste allows for less formal 
complexity and minor because it is alleged to be “necessarily transient, it cannot 
have meaning and it cannot move us” (Telfer 1996: 58). Carolyn Korsmeyer 
responds to Telfer’s claim that food cannot have meaning by arguing that food often 
exhibits the form of symbolization that Nelson Goodman called “exemplification” 
where an object both refers to a property and possesses it (Korsmeyer 1999: 128-131). 
According to Korsmeyer, an item of food may similarly do more than simply possess 
a property (such as freshness, smokiness, spiciness); it may call our attention to that 
property and, in so doing, exemplify it and, hence, possess a form of meaning. 
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(Consider a very spicy curry which calls attention to that spiciness; perhaps by the 
use of a huge number of brightly colored chilies.) Despite this, and a number of 
other symbolic functions which she argues food may possess, she concludes with a 
position that is not so different from Telfer’s. Food is not art “in the full sense of the 
term” (Korsmeyer 1999: 141); that is, it is not a fine art because it lacks the requisite 
history, but it may nevertheless count as a minor, decorative, functional or applied 
art (Korsmeyer 1999: 144). Even more skeptically, Tim Crane (2007) has argued that 
although wines are aesthetic objects, they do not count as works of art.11 
If Telfer is right, at least some of the food of everyday life is art in the full 
sense of that term, and the debate about the ethical criticism of art applies in just 
those cases. If Korsmeyer is right things might be a bit less clear—the standard 
debate focuses on fine art and its near relations, not the decorative, functional or 
applied arts. (But it is hard to see why that debate couldn’t be extended to concern 
the decorative or functional arts.) 
On the other hand, if the food and drink of everyday life is not art, then the 
ethical criticism of art debate, as such, is not directly relevant to it. However, even if 
this is the case there remains the possibility that something analogous to that debate 
is relevant to our appreciation of everyday food. Remember, the core of the ethical 
criticism of art debate is a question concerning the connection between moral and 
aesthetic value. And it is widely accepted that moral and aesthetic value can be found 
outside the sphere of art. For example, food shares with art the potential for ethical 
significance due to its entwinement with human intentions, activity, and impact. So, 
even for those who do not count food of everyday life as art, there remains the 
possibility of extending the ethical criticism of art debate to this domain, as long as 
the food of everyday life possesses aesthetic value. We have already seen that Crane 
holds that this is the case for wine. In the next section, we explore whether there is 
good reason for thinking this is the case for food. 
 
3. The Aesthetic Value of Food 
 
Does the food of everyday life possess aesthetic value? Since everyday food may be 
visually appealing and even beautiful (consider an attractively decorated cake or a 
piece of nigiri sushi), the answer is obviously yes. A trickier issue has to do with 
whether the food of everyday life may possess aesthetic value in virtue of its flavors 
and odors and it is this question that we focus on below. Answering this question 
requires disambiguating various senses of aesthetic value and considering nearby 
concepts. In this section, we consider three ways of answering this question. The 
upshot is that, no matter how one characterizes aesthetic value, the debate about 
ethical criticism remains relevant to appreciating food, including the food of 
everyday life. 
 
3.1. Wide Aesthetic Value 
 
                                                
11 For skeptical views of food as art in the popular press, see Poole (2012) and Deresiewicz (2012). 
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In his Critique of Judgment, Immanuel Kant initially characterizes the idea of an 
aesthetic judgment as one that is distinct from a cognitive or “logical” judgment in 
that it is grounded in something subjective and non-conceptual; namely, pleasure or 
displeasure (Kant 1790/1987: 44). This conception of the aesthetic includes not only 
judgments of beauty and the sublime, but also judgments of what Kant calls “the 
agreeable”, which express sensuous pleasure and mere liking. Judgments of 
agreeability make no claim to universality, and lack the disinterestedness (i.e., 
disconnection from the faculty of desire) that Kant associates with judgments of 
beauty and the sublime (Kant 1790/1987: 47-48, 55-56). Nevertheless, insofar as 
sensuous pleasure has value (qua pleasure) it is legitimate to treat such judgments as 
ascribing a sort of value—we shall call that value wide aesthetic value. Some 
philosophers hold that judgments of tastiness and succulence are not full-fledged 
aesthetic judgments because they are merely judgments of agreeability. But this is 
because they do not have the notion of wide aesthetic value in mind. Clearly, food of 
everyday life can possess wide aesthetic value: Kant’s own discussion of agreeability 
refer to judgments about canary wine (Kant 1790/1987: 55). To call something tasty 
or succulent, then, is arguably to ascribe to it wide aesthetic value. 
 
3.2. Narrow Aesthetic Value 
 
However, those who question whether food possesses aesthetic value typically are 
not thinking of wide aesthetic value.12 Instead, they are thinking of narrow aesthetic 
value, which roughly corresponds to Kant’s “judgment of taste” (i.e., judgments of 
beauty and the sublime) and excludes Kant’s judgments of the agreeable. Unlike 
judgments of agreeability, judgments of taste do, according to Kant, make claim to 
universality, and they are disinterested (Kant 1790/1987: 45-46, 55-56). These 
features have often been seen as characteristic of judgments of narrow aesthetic 
value.13  
On Kant’s account, judgments of beauty are disinterested insofar as they are 
neither based on nor the source of desire. But, then it seems that food cannot possess 
narrow aesthetic value because nothing seems more connected to desire than the 
pleasures we take in tasting and smelling delicious food. One response to this worry 
is to argue that, in certain cases, we may in fact take disinterested pleasure in the 
tastes and smells of food (Monroe 2007: 142). For example, in trying to “do justice” 
to the food, we might try to taste it and appreciate it with a focus beyond satisfying 
our mere desires.14  
Another response to this worry is to deny that the aesthetic is essentially 
linked to disinterestedness, as Kant thought. Contemporary philosophers have 
offered alternative conceptions of narrow aesthetic value. So, for example, Kendall 
                                                
12 For example, Thomas Aquinas questions specifically whether there can be judgments of beauty with tastes and 
smells. He would thus be skeptical of the possibility that food, with respect to those modes of perceptual engagement, 
can possess narrow aesthetic value. For discussion, see McQueen (1993). 
13 Roger Scruton is, perhaps, the best-known contemporary defender of the idea that judgments of beauty and 
aesthetic value are essentially disinterested. See, for example, Scruton (2009). 
14 We thank Eileen John for this suggestion. 
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Walton argues that something possesses aesthetic value when it is appropriate to 
take aesthetic pleasure in it, where aesthetic pleasure is understood, at least to a first 
approximation, as “pleasure which has as a component pleasure taken in one’s 
admiration of something” (Walton 2008: 14). Robert Stecker develops an account of 
aesthetic value rooted in his “minimal conception” of aesthetic experience: “the 
experience of attending in a discriminating manner to forms, qualities or meaningful 
features of things, attending to these for their own sake or for the sake of this very 
experience” (Stecker 2006: 4). On these alternative conceptions of narrow aesthetic 
value, it is difficult to see what could preclude ordinary food from possessing it. 
Since we may admire the flavors of an everyday meal and take pleasure in our 
admiration, it is clear that, according to Walton, the food of everyday life can possess 
narrow aesthetic value. And Stecker holds that “any object that can be attended to in 
the way picked out by the minimal conception can be …a potential source of 
positive aesthetic value” (Stecker 2006: 5). Since we can attend to qualities of 
everyday food items for their own sake or the sake of that experience, nothing keeps 
the food of everyday life from having aesthetic value. 
 
3.3. Aesthetic-ish Values 
 
Even for the strict Kantian who insists that food cannot possess narrow aesthetic 
value, there is a way in which the core of the ethical criticism of art debate remains 
relevant to appreciating food. The fallback option is to appeal to values that we 
might think of as “aesthetic-ish”, such as culinary or gustatory values, and then use 
the ethical criticism of art debate as a model. For example, we might develop 
analogous positions on which the debate between moralists, autonomists, and 
immoralists becomes a debate about the relationship between moral and gustatory 
value. However, since we believe that food of everyday life can possess narrow 
aesthetic value, we believe that this fallback option is not needed. 
 
4. Aesthetic Value, Normativity, and Expertise 
 
There are two related core features of narrow aesthetic value that are worth 
remarking on. First, narrow aesthetic value possess normativity: when we say that a 
painting is beautiful (i.e., aesthetically good), we are doing more than expressing our 
“mere” individual preferences; we are also inviting our interlocutors to share our 
judgment. Second, there can be expertise in aesthetic value of a particular domain, 
which consists in tracking what aesthetically matters to people who are 
psychologically similar. In this section, we expand on these two core features of 
narrow aesthetic value (hereafter simply ‘aesthetic value’) as it applies to food. 
The normativity of aesthetic value associated with food is evident in how we 
talk about food in our daily lives. First, when we talk about a new restaurant we have 
tried and we say, “the food there is delicious”, we are often not just describing our 
own experience, but also making a recommendation. That is, we are often not just 
reporting our own preference, but also suggesting that our interlocutors ought to 
share our judgment. Second, our typical explanations go from value to preference, 
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and not the other way around. It is much more natural to say “I liked this dish 
because it was delicious” than to say “this dish was delicious because I liked it”. The 
fact that we tend to try to explain our preferences in terms of aesthetic evaluations 
suggest that aesthetic value cannot be a matter of individual preferences, but instead 
something independent that we take to be a constraint on our preferences. 
Perhaps the apparent normativity exhibited in common discourse is only 
illusory, though. Skepticism about the reality of value has always lurked in the 
background of any discussion on aesthetic value, and maybe it is even more salient 
for food than for art. Although we will not try to conclusively answer the skeptic in 
this chapter, the literature on metaaesthetics (cf. Zangwill 2014) and metaethics 
offers many possible answers. We will only sketch one such answer here: a naturalist 
realist account of narrow aesthetic value based on Peter Railton (1998)’s 
interpretation of Hume (1757). We are especially attracted to this account because it 
emphasizes the role of human psychological commonalities in grounding narrow 
aesthetic value’s normativity, and it helps to explicate what aesthetic expertise with 
respect to food might consist in. 
As Railton (1998: 68) summarizes the project, 
 
[Hume] is giving an account of the features of human sensibility and the world we 
inhabit in virtue of which aesthetic value can exist and afford a domain of objective 
judgment, a domain in which expert opinion is possible. The ‘joint verdict’ of expert 
opinion is offered by Hume as a solution to the problem of finding a standard of 
taste, not as a way of saying what constitutes aesthetic value. Delicacy of sentiment, 
freedom from prejudice, extensive practice, comparative knowledge, and so on are 
important so that the expert critic can discern matches, that is, can ‘discer[n] that 
very degree and kind of approbation or displeasure which each part is naturally 
fitted to produce’. 
 
On this account, although individual aesthetic experiences do not constitute aesthetic 
value, when sufficiently reconstructed, they can offer a standard for aesthetic 
evaluation.15 The reconstruction is far from trivial, though, since it requires us to 
have “delicacy of sentiment, freedom from prejudice, extensive practice, comparative 
knowledge, and so on”. Experts will be better at making the correct aesthetic 
discernments than ordinary folk, in virtue of possessing these features to a higher 
degree, but we can also gain some of these features as a community by pooling 
together individual aesthetic experiences across cultures and times. 
There is a sense in which aesthetic value is “subjective”: its standards are 
dependent on subjects like us—creatures who share perceptual, sentimental, and 
cognitive infrastructures of human psychology. Collectively speaking, individual 
preferences matter—insofar as they together reflect the infrastructures of human 
psychology. However, in a much more important sense, this form of value is not 
“subjective”: it cannot be identified with any particular individual’s preference. 
                                                
15 The distinction is subtle, so let us borrow Ralton (1998: 69)’s example to clarify it. Suppose there is a watch that is 
perfectly precise. The time as told by the watch still would not constitute real time. However, the watch does serve as 
a true standard of time: there is a regularity between the watch’s time and real time that we can identify a posteriori. 
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Instead, its standards are determined from the impartial aggregation of all aesthetic 
experiences across cultures and times, such that the “noise” from prejudice and other 
distorting factors cancels out, and the “signal” reflecting our perceptual, sentimental, 
and cognitive psychology remains.16  
On this account, expertise in aesthetic value consists in a capacity to respond 
in ways that track regularities in our shared responses. Features like “delicacy of 
sentiment, freedom from prejudice, extensive practice, comparative knowledge, and 
so on” are all useful for tracking what aesthetically matters to us. As Railton (1998: 
70) says, 
 
True judges can exist because there is a subject matter with respect to which they 
can develop expertise, authority, and objectivity. This subject matter is afforded by 
the underlying sensory and cognitive structures that we share with other humans 
and, in particular, with such judges. If refinement on their part led to a fundamental 
alteration in their underlying sensory and cognitive structures, they might be subtle 
judges, but their ‘joint verdict’ would no longer represent expertise about our taste, 
or human taste. We differ from the experts not so much in what matches best and 
most durably the potentials of our underlying structures as in how well we can 
detect these matches. As a result, we accord greater authority to those with 
genuinely acute and experienced palates, and greater authority to ourselves as our 
palates become more acute and experienced. 
 
In other words, expertise in aesthetic value is not something that one is born with, 
but something that one can acquire through attention and experience.  
In fact, on this account, we structure our social practices in order to acquire 
expertise: that is why we have so many ways of exchanging aesthetic evaluations. 
Railton (1998:71) gives a prescient summary of contemporary foodie culture, even 
though he did not obviously have food in mind:  
 
We seek not only to have good taste, but to be taken as having good taste and to 
identify other possessors of good taste. We are relentless producers and consumers 
of opinions, advice, and guides. Our conversation often turns to the exchange of 
judgments, and we are eager to share our enthusiasms and to find confirmation of 
our judgments in the opinions or experiences of others. 
 
Nowadays, services such as TripAdvisor, Yelp, and Foursquare all have users who 
relentlessly review dining spots and vote on each others’ reviews, as well as other 
users who use those reviews to decide on their next meal. We produce and consume 
these reviews to be taken as having good taste and to identify other possessors of 
good taste. Indeed, even those foodies who have not read Hume appear to have 
taken in his insight: we typically do not rely on any single review, but the “joint 
verdicts” of different reviews. 
                                                
16 Hume would have liked the social scientific work on wisdom of crowds, which show that under the right 
conditions, crowds can guide us to the truth much better than any individual, including individual experts. See 
Surowiecki (2004) for an accessible introduction to wisdom of crowds. 
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At the theoretical level, Railton’s naturalist realist account makes sense of 
why aesthetic experiences collectively matter to aesthetic value, and also why 
aesthetic value is more than just individual preference. At the practical level, this 
account also makes sense of our various social practices regarding aesthetic value of 
food, and what expertise in this domain consists in. Nevertheless, it is only fair for us 
to remind readers of a key assumption in this account: the existence of psychological 
similarities in the relevant population. Whether we all largely share the same 
perceptual, sentimental, and cognitive psychology when it comes to aesthetic 
evaluations of food is an open question, and an empirical one. Only further research 
into the psychology of taste can answer that.17 
 
5. Interaction Between Morality and Aesthetics of Food 
 
We are finally ready to return to the interaction between morality and aesthetics of 
food. Our reference point in this section will be Korsmeyer (2012), which is the only 
other philosophical discussion of this interaction that we know of. We will build on 
some of the frameworks that Korsmeyer provides. But we will also argue against the 
food moralist position that Korsmeyer endorses. 
Immediately, discussing the interaction between morality and aesthetics of 
food faces a difficult question: where is the morality in food? With artworks, 
philosophers typically appeal to the moral perspective that the artwork endorses or 
the moral perspective that the artwork engenders in making their moral assessments 
about the works. For example, an art moralist might say that The Birth of a Nation 
(1915), a film that glorifies White Supremacy, is aesthetically worse for its 
endorsement of racist ideology and/or for its effects on viewers’ racial attitudes. 
However, on the face of it, food—and certainly food of everyday life—does not 
typically endorse any moral perspective or engender any moral attitudes.18 
Korsmeyer proposes locating the moral value of food in its causal history—
explicitly borrowing from a strand of art moralism that is called “means moralism”, 
which says that the fact that a work is produced in a morally dubious manner can 
count as a moral defect of the work.19 Korsmeyer (2012: 96) thinks linking a work’s 
                                                
17 Examples of such research into the psychology of taste can be found in Monell Chemical Senses Center and in 
psychologist Charles Spence’s Crossmodal Perception Laboratory at Oxford. 
18 Morrissey might disagree. As the slogan “animals are friends not food” demonstrates, calling something food is 
arguably a moral act in itself. That is, arguably the presentation of something as food constitutes an endorsement of 
a moral perspective and engenders moral attitudes. For example, the presentation of animals as food seems to 
constitute an endorsement of a moral perspective that permits killing animals for human consumption, and seems to 
engender moral attitudes about the permissibility of such killings. For a discussion on the moral implicatures of 
calling something food, see Haslanger (2011: 192) and Plakias (2016). 
19 We can distinguish three aspects of a work in which moral qualities may be located: causal history, content, and 
causal influence. (See Liao and Protasi (2013) for a discussion on the three corresponding kinds of moral criticisms 
of pornography.) In this section, we are following Korsmeyer in focusing on the causal history of food, and arguing 
against her version of food moralism on her own terms. However, this focus on the causal history of food does 
generate a disanalogy between the ethical criticism of food debate, as we have characterized it in this chapter, and the 
ethical criticism of art debate, as it is standardly characterized. In the art debate, philosophers typically focus more 
on moral qualities of a work’s content, such as the moral perspective it endorses, and on moral qualities of a work’s 
causal influence, such as the moral perspective it engenders. In footnote 18, we outline possible ways of locating 
moral qualities in the content and causal influence of food, and we believe it is possible that analogous positions can 
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causal history with its moral status in this way is especially appropriate: “means 
moralism seems especially apt for the assessment of foods and their enjoyments 
because cultivating tastes frequently requires noticing flavors that are the result of 
the way they were produced”. That is, a work’s causal history can become part of a 
work proper when it affects our perception or perceptual experience of the work. In 
discussing the interaction between morality and aesthetics of food, Korsmeyer 
mainly focuses on causal history that is directly accessible via narrow sensory 
perception.20 (We will say more about the idea of directly perceiving causal history 
when we discuss her notion of trace.) However, she also briefly considers causal 
history that enters into our broad perceptual experience, which can contain cognitive 
and affective components in addition to sense data.21 We will consider cases of both 
types below. 
According to Korsmeyer, a trace is a causal historical quality that is directly 
perceptible via our senses. Importantly, not all causal histories are manifested via 
traces, but only some are. Korsmeyer (2012: 95-96) gives the following contrasting 
examples: on the one hand, “[o]ne cannot cultivate a taste for foie gras without 
cultivating a taste for fatty liver of a force-fed geese”; on the other hand, “[t]una 
caught in nets that also kill dolphins are harvested in ways that use unfortunate 
means, but this is not evident in the flavor of the tuna.” According to Korsmeyer, 
while there is moral defect in the causal history in both cases, that causal history is 
only perceptible in the foie gras case. In other words, while the force-feeding left a 
trace in the foie gras, the driftnetting and trawling did not leave a trace in the tuna. 
So, it is only the moral defectiveness of foie gras production that can directly affect 
our narrow sensory perception.22 
The exact relationship between a trace and its morality and aesthetics is 
unclear.23 Sometimes, Korsmeyer (2012: 97) speaks as if the trace itself is at one 
perceptual, moral, and aesthetic: “we can take cruelty of means of production as a 
fairly clear example of how aesthetic taste properties merge with moral taste 
properties.” Or perhaps, by saying so, she means that a trace is a perceptual quality 
on which aesthetic and moral qualities simultaneously depend on. Other times, it 
seems that a trace is a perceptual and aesthetic quality that in some sense contains a 
distinct moral quality: “we have moral properties infused in the taste properties of 
                                                                                                                         
be developed in the ethical criticism of food debate that focuses on those kinds of moral qualities, using similar 
examples. However, we do not investigate this possibility further in this chapter.  
20 She acknowledges that “[t]races of means in flavors are by no means the only indication of moral aspects of eating” 
but also says that it is with traces that “the case for ethical gourmandism is most strongly rooted” (96). 
21 As she wonders in the coda of her essay, “Suppose human flesh tastes delectable. Is it okay to cultivate a taste for 
faux human being? Isn’t there something enduringly terrible about having a taste for human flesh, even if that taste 
is to be satisfied by means of a substitute?” (100). 
22 Foie gras may have not been the best example. According to Barber (2014), there is now a farmer in Spain, 
Eduardo Sousa, who produces foie gras without force-feeding, and that this foie gras tastes—allegedly—as good as, if 
not better than, foie gras produced with force-feeding. (It is not so clear from Barber’s account that this foie gras 
does taste as fatty, however.) Regardless, Korsmeyer can make the same point with a number of other real-world 
cases. For example, it is well known that stress prior to and during slaughter of animals negatively affects perceived 
meat quality (Grandin 1980). In other words, a violent slaughter of an animal can leave a trace in the resulting meat. 
23 We thank Anne Barnhill, Mark Budolfson, Tyler Doggett, Andy Egan, Simon Fokt, and Eileen John for pressing us 
to clarify what Korsmeyer means by “trace”. Indeed, the two authors of this chapter disagree about the best 
interpretation of Korsmeyer’s notion.  
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food” (2012: 96). For our aim of arguing against Korsmeyer, this unclarity with the 
notion is not especially problematic, given the variety of characterizations 
available—from the ethical criticism of art literature—for the relevant connection 
between moral and aesthetic value. Nevertheless, we want to flag this unclarity 
because it can complicate how we think about the parallels between the interaction 
of morality and aesthetics of food and of art. 
Setting those details aside, it is clear that the notion of trace plays an 
important role of Korsmeyer’s argument for (moderate) food moralism—which 
says that a food’s moral value is directly connected to its aesthetic value—and against 
food autonomism—which says that a food’s moral value is unconnected to its 
aesthetic value. Food autonomism is false, Korsmeyer argues, because there can be 
qualities of food—namely, the traces—that make for both moral and aesthetic 
qualities. So, depending on the exact nature of a trace, the moral and aesthetic 
qualities are either connected because they are one and the same, or connected via 
the perceptual quality they simultaneously depend on. She summarizes her 
conclusion as follows: “if certain kinds of meal preparation are morally dubious, and 
if the object and its preparation impart a trace on flavor, then this quality is 
simultaneously aesthetic and moral” (Korsmeyer 2012: 97). 
We entirely agree with Korsmeyer on this conditional conclusion. However, 
we disagree with Korsmeyer that food moralism is the only alternative to food 
autonomism. To see that acceptance of the consequent of Korsmeyer’s conditional 
conclusion does not imply the acceptance of food moralism, we must return to the 
defining thesis of moralism—the valence constraint. Remember that the valence 
constraint says a feature’s effect on the work’s moral value must have the same 
valence as its effect on the work’s aesthetic value. In contrast, the consequent in 
Korsmeyer’s conditional conclusion only says that there can be qualities of food that 
make for both moral and aesthetic qualities; it does not say that the moral and 
aesthetic qualities must have the same valence. 
We think the most plausible view with respect to the interaction between 
morality and aesthetics of food is one that Korsmeyer overlooks. We endorse food 
immoralism, which denies the valence constraint. Since different art immoralists 
spell out the non-accidental connection between moral value and aesthetic value 
differently, we will consider two cases in the food domain that plausibly demonstrate 
different connections between moral and aesthetic value. The first case, which 
constitutes our primary response to Korsmeyer, specifically shows that a trace can be 
morally defective but aesthetically virtuous. In this case, if one took away the moral 
defect by eliminating the trace, then one would thereby take away the aesthetic virtue 
too (compare: Jacobson’s variant of art immoralism). The second case shows a 
different kind of connection that can take place in broader perceptual experience, 
where it is precisely in virtue of the immorality that the food is aesthetically better 
(compare: Eaton’s variant of art immoralism). 
Our first case for food immoralism concerns the practice of ikizukuri, where 
a skilled chef cuts off parts of a live fish and re-plates them as sashimi slices on the 
fish and serves them to the customer immediately, sometimes with the fish still 
showing some lingering signs of life. By cutting up fish that is still alive, the chef 
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causes even more pain to the sentient creature than typical seafood preparation 
practices. As such, we think ikizukuri sashimi is morally defective. Nevertheless, by 
cutting up fish that is still alive, the chef is also able to serve sashimi that is as fresh as 
possible. As such, we think ikizukuri sashimi is aesthetically virtuous because 
freshness is a highly valued aesthetic feature of sashimi in general. The connection 
between the moral defect and aesthetic virtue of ikizukuri sashimi is non-accidental; 
one could not have one without having the other. The same causal historical quality 
associated with ikizukuri, cutting up fish that is still alive, give rise to a trace in the 
sashimi that makes for both a moral defect and an aesthetic virtue. 
No doubt some readers are already recoiling at the thought of this practice 
and having a hard time imagining tasting the result as delicious. We have three 
comments in response. 
First, we want to urge these readers to recall the discussion of experts and 
normative values in section 4. In aesthetics, as is the case with other normative 
domains, there should be a prima facie deferral to experts, where expert opinions are 
available.24 Many real world gourmands seek out and enjoy experiences of eating 
ikizukuri sashimi and its kin.25 Remember that one feature that is conducive to 
expertise is freedom from prejudice. Perhaps the fact that many Western gourmands 
seek out and enjoy experiences of eating ikizukuri sashimi and its kin is a sign that 
they are better able to overcome cultural prejudices in their aesthetic evaluation than 
are ordinary folk. At least, one should question whether one’s initial repulsion is a 
product of the kind of prejudice that Hume warned us against. 
Second, most people actually already acknowledge the central aesthetic 
virtue of ikizukuri sashimi: freshness.26 Specifically, for sashimi, freshness is perhaps 
the most salient quality in taste besides the fish source. So, in a way, it is not at all 
surprising that serving sashimi as freshly as possible—by cutting it off from a live 
fish—should result in an aesthetically virtuous product. The preference for freshness, 
especially in such a highly perishable food category, seems exactly the kind of thing 
that would be basic in human psychological infrastructure. The gourmands who 
recommend ikizukuri sashimi, then, can be said to be Humean experts who are able 
to track what aesthetically matter to us, given our psychological infrastructures. 
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that saying ikizukuri sashimi is delicious is 
absolutely not the same as saying eating it or selling it is ethically or legally 
permissible. Indeed, the whole point of this case being a data point in favor of food 
immoralism is that the practice of ikizukuri is, in fact, morally defective. Whether a 
                                                
24 We do want to also acknowledge that it is notoriously tricky to appeal to expertise in the context of the interaction 
between morality and aesthetics. It is difficult to say anything definitive and substantive without begging the very 
central question of the debate. For example, one cannot require aesthetic expertise to include moral sensitivity 
without presupposing the falsity of autonomism. Indeed, Jacobson (2005) has argued that Carroll (2000) begs the 
question in exactly this way when he invokes an idealized audience in arguing for art moralism. We make no 
assumptions about the moral sensitivity of real world gourmands. 
25 Similar practices can be found in other East Asian cuisines. For example, Korean cuisine has sannakji, which is the 
practice of serving live octopus, and Chinese cuisine has yin-yang shrimp, where only the body is flash fried and the 
head remains uncooked. 
26 We are thinking of freshness as an aesthetic quality in itself. However, our argument is compatible with thinking 
of freshness as a shorthand for a cluster of more basic aesthetic qualities. We thank Eileen John for raising this worry 
and suggesting this response. 
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morally defective practice should be outlawed is a separate and difficult question. 
Answering the question requires judging how moral value ought to be weighed 
against other human values, such as aesthetic value, in structuring our social 
practices. It is perfectly reasonable, and perfectly consistent with food immoralism, 
for someone who thinks moral value is the sole value relevant to law to believe that, 
no matter how delicious the sashimi is, ikizukuri should be outlawed. 
Our second case for food immoralism concerns the practice of zoophagy, 
where gourmands seek out exotic animals—sometimes, that means animals that 
belong to endangered species—to consume as food. It is easily imaginable that such 
gourmands would still seek out endangered species to eat even if there were non-
endangered species that can provide the same exact narrow sensory perception. 
Presumably, they would do so because it is the knowledge that the meat comes from 
an animal that belongs to an endangered species that heightens aesthetically their 
broad perceptual experience. The novelty of the experience is inextricably bound to 
the knowledge of the animal’s endangered status. So, according to such gourmands, 
it is precisely in virtue of the known immoral causal history that the food is 
aesthetically better. Of course, the food may still be aesthetically not good, all things 
considered, because connections between moral and aesthetic value are only pro 
tanto and because there can be many different pro tanto connections between moral 
and aesthetic value with respect to the same food.27 
With these two cases as our paradigms, it is not difficult to find other data 
points in favor of food immoralism. Indeed, we believe that Korsmeyer (2012: 98) 
inadvertently gives another case when she quotes the renowned gourmand (and 
occasional novelist) Alexandre Dumas:28 
 
In Toulouse they have a special way of fattening ortolans which is better than 
anywhere else; when they want to eat them, they asphyxiate them by immersing 
their heads in a very strong vinegar, a violent death which has a beneficial effect on 
the flesh.  
 
Dumas is acknowledging that this way of eating ortolans is morally defective—the 
asphyxiation results in an unnecessarily violent death. (Nowadays, ortolans are also 
considered endangered in France.) Indeed, it is so morally defective that diners are 
said to cover themselves up while eating the ortolans in order to shield themselves 
from the eyes of God. Yet, on our reading, Dumas is also saying that the same causal 
historical quality—the violent asphyxiation—leaves a trace in such ortolans 
                                                
27 This clarification is especially salient with the case of zoophagy. Although we focus on the moral qualities located 
in the causal history of food and their pro tanto connections to aesthetic qualities, we acknowledge (in footnote 18) 
that there can also be moral qualities located in the content and causal influence of food. And these moral qualities 
may have distinct pro tanto connections with aesthetic qualities. Hence, in the case of zoophagy, the expressive 
moral value in presenting and eating endangered species as food may also make it aesthetically worse through 
distinct pro tanto connections between moral and aesthetic value. 
28 We believe that further examples can be found in Korsmeyer (2002), which discusses how cuisine can sometimes 
transform the disgusting into the delicious.  
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(“beneficial effect on the flesh”) that makes them aesthetically more virtuous (“better 
than anywhere else”) than ortolans prepared without the violent asphyxiation.29 
We think cases like ikizukuri, zoophagy, and ortolans suggest that the 
valence constraint is false in the food domain. As such, we should be food 
immoralists, who say that food can exhibit different types of connections between 
moral value and aesthetic value, including ones that invert the valence. We leave the 
application of this conclusion to the case of meat as an exercise to the reader. 
 
6. Further Philosophical Implications 
 
In this chapter, we have outlined the shape of a debate on the interaction between 
morality and aesthetics of food, and argued for an overlooked position in this 
debate—food immoralism. We close by briefly suggesting two further philosophical 
implications of our discussion. 
First, for many people, food autonomism is likely to be the default position. 
Many other chapters in this handbook discuss in detail various moral considerations 
that are relevant to food. If we (and Korsmeyer) are correct in our rejection of food 
autonomism, then one surprising consequence is that the various moral 
considerations discussed in this handbook can also turn out to be highly relevant to 
aesthetic considerations. So we need to think further about how each of those moral 
considerations interacts with aesthetic value. 
Second, considerations about the interaction between morality and 
aesthetics of food can guide us to new considerations regarding the interaction 
between morality and aesthetics of art. As we have argued, the food debate is either 
an extension of or analogous to the art debate. As such, the position that one accepts 
in the food debate at least provides a pro tanto reason in favor of the analogous 
position in the art debate.30 This pro tanto reason can be overridden or undercut, of 
course, but doing so requires further philosophical discussion on, say, why the art 
domain is distinct from the food domain in terms of basic interactions between 
human values.  
  
                                                
29 However, given what we now know about the effect of violent slaughter on meat quality (see footnote 22), it is also 
plausible that the ortolan case is—contrary to Dumas’s own characterization—more like the zoophagy case than the 
ikizukuri case. That is, it is plausible that it is really the knowledge of the immoral causal history that heightened 
aesthetically Dumas’s broader perceptual experience. 
30 The structural analogy between ethical criticism of art and ethical criticism of food therefore mirrors the structural 
analogy between ethical criticism of art and ethical criticism of humor. For example, Jacobson (1997) argues for art 
immoralism by way of an analogy to jokes, and Smuts (1999) responds by arguing for comic moralism (and thus also 
art moralism). However, see footnote 19 for a disanalogy between the ethical criticism of food debate, as we have 
characterized it in this chapter, and the ethical criticism of art debate, as it is standardly characterized. 
 18 
References 
 
Anderson, James C. and Dean, Jeffrey T. (1998). “Moderate Autonomism”. British Journal of 
Aesthetics 38(2): 150–166. 
Barber, Dan (2014). The Third Plate. New York: Penguin. 
Booth, Wayne C. (1998). “Why Banning Ethical Criticism is a Serious Mistake”. Philosophy 
and Literature 22(2): 366–393. 
Carroll, Noël (1996). “Moderate Moralism”. British Journal of Aesthetics 36(3): 223–237. 
Carroll, Noël (1998). “Moderate Moralism Versus Moderate Autonomism”. British Journal of 
Aesthetics 38(4): 419–424. 
Carroll, Noël (2000). “Art and Ethical Criticism: An Overview of Recent Directions of 
Research”. Ethics 110(2): 350–387. 
Carroll, Noël (2013). “Rough Heroes: A Response to A.W. Eaton”. The Journal of Aesthetics 
and Art Criticism 71(4): 371–376. 
Clifton, Scott (2014). “Non-Branching Moderate Moralism”. Philosophia 42(1): 95–111. 
Cooke, Brandon (2014). “Ethics and Fictive Imagining”. The Journal of Aesthetics and Art 
Criticism 72(3): 317–327. 
Crane, Tim (2007). “Wine as an Aesthetic Object”. In Smith, Barry (ed.) Questions of Taste. 
Oxford: Signal Books, 141–156. 
Dadlez, E. M. and Bicknell, Jeanette (2013). “Not Moderately Moral: Why Hume Is Not a 
‘Moderate Moralist’”. Philosophy and Literature 37(2): 330–342.  
Deresiewicz, William (2012). “A Matter of Taste?” The New York Times October 26. URL = 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/28/opinion/sunday/how-food-replaced-art-as-
high-culture.html> 
Eaton, A. W. (2012). “Robust Immoralism”. The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 70(2): 
281–292. 
Eaton, A. W. (2013). “Reply to Carroll: The Artistic Value of a Particular Kind of Moral 
Flaw”. The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 71(4): 376–379. 
Eaton, A. W. (2016). “Literature and Morality”. In Carroll, Noël and Gibson, John (eds.), The 
Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Literature. New York: Routledge, 433–450. 
Eaton, Marcia Muelder (2001). Merit, Aesthetic and Ethical. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
Gaut, Berys (1998). “The Ethical Criticism of Art”. In Levinson, Jerrold (ed.), Aesthetics and 
Ethics. New York: Cambridge University Press, 182–203. 
Gilmore, Jonathan (2011). “A Functional View of Artistic Evaluation”. Philosophical 
Studies 155(2): 289–305. 
Giovanelli, Alessandro (2007). “The Ethical Criticism of Art: A New Mapping of the 
Territory”. Philosophia 35(2): 117–127. 
Grandin, Temple (1980). “The Effect of Stress on Livestock and Meat Quality Prior To And 
During Slaughter”. International Journal for the Study of Animal Problems 1(5): 
313–337. 
Hanson, Karen (1998). “How Bad Can Good Art Be?”. In Levinson, Jerrold (ed.), Aesthetics 
and Ethics. New York: Cambridge University Press, 204–226. 
Harold, James (2006). “On Judging the Moral Value of Narrative Artworks”. The Journal of 
Aesthetics and Art Criticism 64(2): 259–270. 
Harold, James (2008). “Immoralism and the Valence Constraint”. British Journal of Aesthetics 
48(1): 45–64. 
Harold, James (2011). “Autonomism Reconsidered”. British Journal of Aesthetics 51(2): 137–
147. 
 19 
Harris, John (1979). “Oral and Olfactory Art”. The Journal of Aesthetic Education 13(4): 5–15. 
Haslanger, Sally (2011). “Ideology, Generics, and Common Ground”. In Witt, Charlotte (ed.), 
Feminist Metaphysics. New York: Springer Verlag, 179–207.  
Hume, David (1757) “Of the Standard of Taste”. In Essays: Moral, Political and Literary, Vol. 
1, London: Longmans, Green, and Co, 231–258. 
Jacobson, Daniel (1997). “In Praise of Immoral Art”. Philosophical Topics 25(1): 155–199. 
Jacobson, Daniel (2005). “Ethical Criticism and the Vice of Moderation”. In Kieran, Matthew 
(ed.), Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art. New York: 
Blackwell, 342–355. 
John, Eileen (2005). “Artistic Value and Opportunistic Moralism”. In Kieran, Matthew (ed.), 
Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art. New York: Blackwell, 
332–341. 
Kant, Immanuel (1790/1987). Critique of Judgment. Trans. Werner S. Pluhar. Indianapolis, 
IN: Hackett. 
Kieran, Matthew (2001). “In Defence of the Ethical Evaluation of Narrative Art”. British 
Journal of Aesthetics 41(1): 26–38.  
Kieran, Matthew (2003). “Forbidden Knowledge: The Challenge of Immoralism”. In 
Bermudez, Jose Luis and Gardner, Sebastian (eds.), Art and Morality. New York: 
Routledge. 
Kieran, Matthew (2006). “Art, Morality, and Ethics: On the (Im)Moral Character of Art 
Works and Inter-Relations to Artistic Value”. Philosophy Compass 1(2): 129–143. 
Korsmeyer, Carolyn (1999). Making Sense of Taste: Food and Philosophy. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press. 
Korsmeyer, Carolyn (2002). “Delightful, Delicious, Disgusting”. The Journal of Aesthetics and 
Art Criticism 60(3): 217–225.  
Korsmeyer, Carolyn (2012). “Ethical Gourmandism,” In Kaplan, David M. (ed.), The 
Philosophy of Food. Berkeley: University of California Press, 87–102.  
Lamarque, Peter and Olsen, Stein Haugom (1994). Truth, Fiction, and Literature. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Liao, Shen-yi and Protasi, Sara (2013). “The Fictional Character of Pornography”. In Maes, 
Hans (ed.), Pornographic Art and the Aesthetics of Pornography. New York: Palgrave 
Mcmillan, 100–118.  
Maes, Hans and Levinson, Jerrold (2012). Art and Pornography: Philosophical Essays. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Mason, Michelle (2001). “Moral Prejudice and Aesthetic Deformity: Rereading Hume’s ‘Of 
the Standard of Taste’”. The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 59(1): 59–71.  
McQueen, Donald (1993). “Aquinas on the Aesthetic Relevance of Tastes and Smells”. British 
Journal of Aesthetics 33(4): 346–356. 
McGregor, Rafe (2014). “A Critique of the Value Interaction Debate”. British Journal of 
Aesthetics 54(4): 449–466. 
Meskin, Aaron (2013). “The Art of Food”. The Philosopher’s Magazine 61: 81–86 
Monroe, David (2007), “Can Food Be Art? The Problem of Consumption”. In Alhoff, Fritz 
and Monroe, David (eds.), Food and Philosophy: Eat, Think, and be Merry. Malden, 
MA: Blackwell, 133–144. 
Nussbaum, Martha (1998). “Exactly and Responsibly: A Defense of Ethical Criticism”. 
Philosophy and Literature 22(2): 343–365. 
Plakias, Alexandra (2016). “Beetles, Bicycles, and Breath Mints: How ‘Omni’ Should 
Omnivores Be?”. In Bramble, Ben and Fischer, Bob (eds.), The Moral Complexities 
of Eating Meat. New York: Oxford University Press, 199–213. 
 20 
 
Poole, Steven (2012). “Let’s Start the Foodie Backlash”. The Guardian September 28. URL = 
<http://web.archive.org/web/20150714104948/http://www.theguardian.com/books/
2012/sep/28/lets-start-foodie-backlash> 
Posner, Richard A. (1997). “Against Ethical Criticism”. Philosophy and Literature 21(1): 1–27. 
Posner, Richard A. (1998). “Against Ethical Criticism: Part Two”. Philosophy and Literature 
22(2): 394–412. 
Quinet, Marienne L. (1981). “Food as Art: The Problem of Function”. British Journal of 
Aesthetics 21(2): 159–171. 
Railton, Peter (1998). “Aesthetic Value, Moral Value, and the Ambitions of Naturalism”. In 
Levinson, Jerrold (ed.), Aesthetics and Ethics. New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 59–105. 
Rupe, Shade (1999). “Meat Is Theater!”. gettingit.com: a webzine. URL = 
<http://web.archive.org/web/20150702083644/http://www.gettingit.com/article/377
>. 
Scruton, Roger (2009). Beauty. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Smuts, Aaron (2009). “Do Moral Flaws Enhance Amusement?”. American Philosophical 
Quarterly 46(2): 151–163. 
Stecker, Robert (2005). “The Interaction Between Ethical and Aesthetic Value”. British 
Journal of Aesthetics 45(2): 138–150. 
Stecker, Robert (2006). “Aesthetic Experience and Aesthetic Value”. Philosophy Compass 1(1): 
1–10. 
Stecker, Robert (2008). “Immoralism and the Anti-Theoretical View”. British Journal of 
Aesthetics 48(2): 145–161. 
Surowiecki, James (2004). The Wisdom of Crowds: Why the Many Are Smarter Than the Few 
and How Collective Wisdom Shapes Business, Economies, Societies and Nations. New 
York: Doubleday. 
Telfer, Elizabeth (1996). Food for Thought: Philosophy and Food. New York: Routledge. 
Walton, Kendall (2008). Marvelous Images: On Value and the Arts. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Winterbourne, A. T. (1981). “Is Oral and Olfactory Art Possible?” The Journal of Aesthetic 
Education 15(2): 95–102.  
Zangwill, Nick (2014). “Aesthetic Judgment”. In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall 2014 Edition, URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/aesthetic-judgment/>. 
